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RESEARCH THAT SUCCEEDS,
POLICIES THAT FAIL
LISA A. FRISCH*
The battering of women in intimate relationships has existed
for thousands of years. Until early in the twentieth century, women
were considered "chattel," and it was legally and socially tolerated
for husbands to use violence against their wives unless "some permanent injury be inflicted or there be an excess of violence."'
Although there were various attempts through the years to challenge the legal and social support for this violence, not until the
1970s did the efforts of the feminist movement and battered women
themselves result in significant change.
These early calls for change were hardly shocking. Advocates
for change asked only that battered women be treated with fairness
and be provided an opportunity forjustice. 2 They questioned why a
woman beaten in her own home by her husband was denied this
justice, while someone assaulted in the street was recognized as a
legitimate victim of a crime. 3 No one argued that our system ofjustice was perfect or that exercising legal authority over these offenders would magically solve a centuries-old problem. Advocates
believed, however, that treating victims of domestic violence as seriously as other victims of violent crime would, if nothing else, communicate that the behavior was no longer socially or legally
* Director of the Domestic Violence Police Policy and Training Project, New York
State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence.
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2 DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 31-35

(1976);

SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND

MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATrERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

155-83 (1982); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC

POLICY 20-27, 228-76 (Jan. 1978).
3 U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT

10-26 (1984);

LISA

G.

LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE:

INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINALJUSTICE RESPONSE 13-14 (1981); DAVID REED ET AL., CHICAGO
LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDY GROUP, ALL THEY CAN Do ... POLICE RESPONSE TO BATTERED

WOMEN'S COMPLAINTS 1-9 (1983).

209

210

LISA A. FRISCH

[Vol. 83

4

tolerated.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s many laws were changed
to reflect the criminalization of battering.5 The impetus for these
changes stemmed largely from the efforts of battered women's advocates, but there were other significant influences as well. Civil
suits against police proliferated, clarifying the constitutional issues
of due process and equal protection under law. 6 Actors within the

criminal justice system, including the U.S. Attorney General, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (hereinafter "I.A.C.P.")
and the U.S. Department of Justice, began to promote changes so
7
long demanded by women.
Interestingly, the vast majority of these calls for change, and the
strongest push for criminalization, occurred prior to the 1983 domestic violence study in Minneapolis. 8 Further, these change efforts
rarely, if ever, hinged on the notion of specific deterrence. The impetus for change was predicated, instead, on equal justice under
4

U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note

3,

at 10-

25; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2.

5 In many states, such as New York, there were various legal changes that reflected
the trend toward criminalization. In 1970, police were given the authority to make warrantless arrests in misdemeanor cases when there exists reasonable belief that a crime
has been committed (1970 N.Y. Laws § 996, amended, 1971 N.Y. Laws § 997). This
change, at a minimum, gave police the discretion to arrest those who committed misdemeanor assaults against intimates when the crime was not witnessed by police. Married
women in New York were given the right to have their abusive husbands criminally prosecuted in 1977, when victims of family offenses were permitted to have their cases heard
in either Family Court or criminal court (1977 N.Y. Laws § 449). In 1980, first degree
assaults were removed from the list of Family Offenses in New York State, giving the
criminal court exclusive jurisdiction over these serious crimes (N.Y. FCA § 812(1)
(1980)). The following year, the original purpose of Family Court proceedings, keeping
the family unit "intact," was amended to reflect the goals of stopping the violence, ending family disruption and assisting victims in obtaining protection (N.Y. FCA
§ 812(2)(b) and CPL § 530.11 (2)(b)). Victims of family violence began to achieve equitable status with other crime victims through an amendment to the Executive Law in
1983, which made abuse victims eligible for compensation to the same extent as other
crime victims (1983 N.Y. Laws § 805).
6 Watson v. Kansas City, CA 10, No. 86-2501 (Sept. 14, 1988); Sorichetti v. City of
New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 492 N.Y.2d 591 (1985); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595
F.Supp. 1521 (1984); DeLong v. County of Erie, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983); Bruno v.
Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Baker v. City of New York, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515
(1966).
7 See U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3. See
also GAIL GOOLKASIAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
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law. As early as 1976, for example, the trial judge in the landmark
Bruno v. Codd case in New York City required police to exercise their
discretion to arrest in a reasonable, non-arbitrary manner and not to
automatically decline to make an arrest solely because the assaulter
is married to the victim. 9 Also that year, the I.A.C.P. issued two
Training Keys on wife beating that directed the police to treat physically assaulted wives as crime victims and not to shield violent husbands from prosecution.' 0 After a year-long study of the problem,
the Police Executive Research Forum, a national organization of police chiefs, issued a report that concluded that a policy of arrest in
domestic violence cases was appropriate and that called for training
of police in the new response." In 1984, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence made only passing reference
to the issue of deterrence, stating that
an assault is a crime, regardless of the relationship of the parties. A
person beaten in the home is no less a victim than a person beaten on
the sidewalk in front of the12home. The law should not stop at the front
door of the family home.
The issue of liability became even more apparent in 1984 when
a federal court in Connecticut awarded Tracey Thurman, a battered
woman, $2.3 million in her lawsuit against the City of Torrington
and twenty-four police officers as the result of the police department's policy and practice of non-arrest in domestic violence
cases. 13 The court ruled that official behavior that reflects an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference to victims of domestic assault violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14
These and numerous other instigators of change provided an
atmosphere for the criminalization of woman battering with the ultimate goal of equitable treatment of victims. 15 Deterrence as the ma9 Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
10 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Wife-Beating, supra note 7; International Association of Chiefs of Police, Investigation of Wife-Beating, supra note 7.
11 NANCY LOVING, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING: A GUIDE FOR
POLICE (Police Executive Research Forum 1980).
12 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 11.

13 Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). The award

was later reduced to $1.9 million.
14 Id. at 1527.
15 GAIL GOOLKASIAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL
COURT JUDGES (National Institute of Justice 1986); U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 3; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1982); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977

(Sup. Ct. 1977); International Association of Chiefs of Police, Wife-Beating, supra note 7;
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Investigation of Wife-Beating, supra note 7
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jor impetus for change was promoted not by victims, advocates or
policymakers, but by those engaged in academic research. 16 The
1983 Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment specifically
sought to determine which law enforcement intervention-arrest,
7
mediation, or separation-best deterred future domestic violence.'
Advocates for change, including this writer, welcomed the results of
the study, which indicated that arrest was the most effective intervention, and quickly added the research to our repertoire of reasons
for policy change.18 Deterrence, however, was never the primary reason for the change in police response. In the police training and
policy development seminars that the New York State Office for the
Prevention of Domestic Violence conducts across the state, it is rare
to find a police executive with more than a passing knowledge of the
deterence research. The most compelling reason for change in law
enforcement, to no one's surprise, is the fear of civil liability.
Although the research is presented in the Office's seminars, most
police pragmatically believe that arrest may be the best response to
the problem but is hardly the ultimate solution. Then why this artificial emphasis on deterrence?
Deterrence is but one goal of the justice system, and it is largely
a hypothetical one. It is generally believed that, if permanent prevention of crime were indeed even attainable, arrest would be only
one component of the process. Broadly, long-term deterrence
would require "basic modification of cultural values, revision of opportunity structures, reorganization of social class systems and elimination of economic imbalance." '9 No one, in or out of the criminal
justice system, would presume that arrest alone could produce such
a sweeping change. At most, the system's ability to achieve "prevention in the crime control context means short-term deterrence of
potential violators." 20 The results of the replication studies following the Minneapolis Experiment, ironically, offer data indicating
that, among many domestic violence offenders, arrest provides a deterrent effect in the short-term. 2 1 If this measure of deterrence had
16 Richard Berk & Lawrence Sherman, Police Response to Domestic Violence Incidents, 401
AM. STAT. ASS'N 83 (1988); LAWRENCE SHERMAN & RICHARD BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT, supra note 8; Lawrence Sherman & Richard Berk,
Police Response to Domestic Violence Incidents, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261-71 (1984).
17 SHERMAN & BERK, supra note 8.
18 Other reasons for policy change include equal justice for battered women, accountability of batterers, equal protection, civil liability concerns, and victim safety.
19 DONALD J. NEWMAN & PATRICK R. ANDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
45 (1989).
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20 Id.

21 Lawrence Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992); Richard A.
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been identified as a goal, the replication studies would have supported the premise of the Minneapolis Experiment. Moreover, the
studies' findings that unemployed, socially "marginal" batterers are
not deterred by arrest 22 is no more surprising than the fact that our
entire justice system fails to deter the majority of socially marginal
criminals from committing any crime. Our criminal justice system
chooses to continue to respond to burglars, armed robbers, drug
dealers and muggers even though deterrence is rarely achieved.
The Milwaukee researchers further warned that arrest may actually escalate the violence of these marginal batterers and that perhaps "punishment should be made less severe in order to reduce an
escalation effect." 23 When these batterers assaulted their victims
subsequent to an arrest, the researchers presumed that the assault
was the direct result of the arrest, rather than the responsibility and
choice of the offender. 24 Should we then believe that when a burglar burglarizes again when released from jail, he did so because he
was incarcerated? Or that a "busted" drug dealer continues to ply
his trade simply because he was angry that he was arrested? Would
these offenders not have likely continued their illegal behavior, with
or without criminal justice intervention?
The narrow analysis of the replication studies points out the
information vacuum within which much of the research was conducted. Rarely were the dynamics of domestic violence considered,
particularly the recognition that battering is not a single incident
but rather a pattern of behavior that escalates in frequency and severity over time. As the Pennsylvania Attorney General recently reported, "the majority of victims are assaulted several times a year,
and there are documented cases of daily assaults." 2 5 Similarly, in
her study of battered women who killed their abusers, Angela
Browne found that sixty-three percent of these women and fortyfive percent of a control group of battered women who had not
killed, reported abusive incidents occurring more than once a
month.2 6 The abuse also increased in severity over time: Eighty
percent of the homicide group and fifty-eight percent of the control
group reported that the physical abuse worsened during the course
Berk et al., A BayesianAnalysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992).
22 Sherman et al., supra note 21 at 158-59, 167-69.
23 Id. at 168.
24 Id.

at 167-69.

25 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FAMILY VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A MODEL PROTOCOL FOR POLICE RESPONSE 13 (1989).
26 ANGELA BROWN, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 68 (1987).
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of the relationship. 27 Given this general escalation trend, it would
appear more accurate to conclude that arrest alone was ineffective in
halting the long-term expected progression of violence by marginal offenders, rather than to fault the arrest for the subsequent violence.
Despite the absence of long-term deterence among marginal offenders, the fact that the studies indicated a potential short-term deterrent effect on these previously undeterred offenders 28 should be
considered a positive effect, and the temporary period of non-violence should be viewed as a window of opportunity for other
interventions.
For victims of battering, this window of opportunity, however
brief, is extremely valuable. Even if it consists only of the offender's
arrest processing period, victims may for the first time, with appropriate assistance, be able to get to safety. If victim safety is, as it
should be, a primary concern of the researchers and policymakers,
then the information that some (if not most) victims are at risk of
repeat assaults should promote change in other areas in the system,
rather than suggest the discontinuance of the arrest intervention,
one of the only measures of official assistance provided to victims.
Taking account of the escalation effect of short arrest, as described in the Milwaukee study, 29 one might give priority to safety of
the victims who are likely to be at increased risk of additional violence as a result of the batterer's arrest. The concern of the researchers that arresting and then quickly releasing batterers from
custody may be worse than not arresting at all is one shared by battered women and advocates.3 0 In New York, for example, police
who develop policies in coordination with the Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence do not, as a rule, release suspects on appearance tickets for any domestic violence offense; and the majority
have a policy not to set desk bail but rather exercise their discretion
to hold the suspect for arraignment before a judge.31 Victims are
informed at the time of the arrest that the suspect may soon be reId.
Sherman et al., supra note 21; Berk et al., supra note 21.
Sherman et al., supra note 21, at 154-56.
30 Id.
31 The Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence has assisted over 150 police
agencies in developing policies on domestic violence. Each policy contains a section on
bail and appearance tickets that vary slightly, depending on local conditions (such as the
availability of a lock-up facility) but the majority of departments do not issue appearance
tickets in domestic violence cases and will hold a suspect for arraignment by a judge
whenever possible, rather than set desk bail. When circumstances require desk bail,
maximum bail is used. One excellent example of a policy on the release of suspects is
that of the Saratoga Springs, New York Police Department, which states "Field release,
or appearance tickets, shall not be issued, nor pre-arraignment bail set on an arrestee in
27
28
29

1992]

COMMENTARY

leased from custody; furthermore, police are required to inform victims about their legal rights and available services, whether or not
32
an arrest is made.
Subsequent to an arrest, the role of the police diminishes, and it
becomes essential for the other officials and actors in the system to
take responsibility and respond appropriately. The replication studies should be used to promote effective follow-up to an arrest
.through prosecution policies, batterers' intervention programs, probation supervision, advocates in the courtroom to assist victims, judicial education, and increased services for victims and their
children. Professional training and policy development for all those
who deal with victims and offenders is essential to promote a coordinated community response to the problem. This training is perhaps
most important for police in order to help alter long-standing attitudes about the problem, inform them of the devastating impacts of
this violence on the victim and children, educate them in the issues
of liability and in the implications of research, and assist them in
identifying actions they can take to protect victims better and to
hold offenders accountable. Training is the key to effective policy
implementation. If the police officers on the street have no investment in or understanding of the policy change, little will change for
victims of battering. Although we must stop depending entirely on
police to solve this and many other social problems, the impact of an
effective police response to domestic violence cannot be underestimated. In the experience of the members of the more than 150 police agencies in New York that have worked with the Office to
change their policies, what police do or do not do at the scene of a
domestic call can make a tremendous difference to the victim. An
example of this impact is best illustrated by an excerpt of a two-page
letter written by a battered woman to the chief of a department that
had recently implemented a pro-arrest policy. In it the woman
wrote:
The emotional support the Officer offered at a time when I was desperately in need of it, is what really prompted this letter.... I felt that
he sincerely cared about me and frankly, without that support, I3 don't
know if I would have appeared in court the following morning. 3
A community's strong police policy is also the most effective
Domestic Violence cases. Any deviation from this procedure must be approved by the
"Officer-in-Charge and documented in writing in the case file."
32 Sherman et al., supra note 21.
33 This letter was written by a victim of battering in May 1988 to the Chief of Police
in Albany, New York, commending the new departmental policy of arresting domestic
abusers and applauding the responding officers for their supportive treatment of her. It
was routed to staff of the Office by Captain H. John Damino of the Albany Police Depart-
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impetus for change in other parts of the criminal justice system.
How long can prosecutors and judges ignore the police reports
coming across their desks? How long can we, as a society, ignore
the thousands of homeless battered women and their children, the
countless injuries suffered and the tragic deaths that might have
been avoided? The answer to the obvious need to "control domestic violence" does not rest, as Dr. Sherman and his co-authors suggest, on increased funding for shelters. 34 Such funding, though
helpful and necessary, merely ameliorates the victims' plight because shelters are only a temporary response to the immediate
safety needs of victims and children; furthermore, they are not used
by the majority of battered women. It is sad to see the continued
focus on victim flight rather than on better victim protection by consistently holding their abusers legally accountable. It is painful for
those of us who have worked long to achieve a measure ofjustice for
battered women to see how eager the media has been to report that
arrests for domestic violence "backfire" 3 5 and quote Dr. Sherman in
calling for a repeal of mandatory arrest laws, 3 6 as though these laws
were predicated solely on his previous research. In fact, Delbert Elliot, who participated in the Omaha replication study,3 7 earlier
wrote of the need to place such research in its proper perspective.
He stated, "There is no historical evidence that empirical evaluation
results have ever been the primary basis for policy decisions, and
there is no compelling logic that they should be a dominant factor in
policymaking." 3 8 It is imperative that we continue to put this research in an appropriate context and use it effectively to spark additional positive change throughout the system rather than allow it to
be used as yet another reason for official inaction. The noted legal
scholar Franklin Zimring wrote, "Advanced societies take family violence seriously." 39 It is time that we show just how advanced we
truly are.

ment, who was the primary author of their newly developed pro-arrest policy. Captain
Damino attached a note stating "Hurray, it works!!"
34 Sherman et al., supra note 21, at 169.
35 See Daniel Goleman, Do Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic Violence?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at C8; Jennifer Toth, New Study of Domestic Violence FindsMandatory
Arrests Backfire, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at A5.
36 Sherman et al., supra note 21, at 168-69.
37 Delbert S. Elliot, CriminalJustice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes, in FAMILY VioLENCE 427 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds. 1989).
38 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FAMILY VIOLENCE TASK FORCE,
39 Id. at 567.

supra note 25, at 474.

